Yet to a self-confessed cynic of the link between game plans and results, it was one out of the box and a triumph for St Kilda coach Ross Lyon.
As regular readers of this column would be aware, I’m a firm believer that very rarely is a game plan the reason a team wins. It’s almost always effort and execution that determine the outcome.
But Lyon, settling into life without Nick Riewoldt, went into the round six clash with the Dogs with a plan designed to make sure the game would be very low scoring and hoping to scunge a win without the need to play great attacking footy or to kick a big score.
At three-quarter time when trailing by 15 points but restricting the Bulldogs to six goals the stopping strategy had worked well enough but a win still looked unlikely.
The combination of the enormous will of Lenny Hayes to again stimulate a St Kilda comeback, a couple of costly Bulldog turnovers and three late goals was enough to get them over the line.
St Kilda without Riewoldt could not afford to get into a free-flowing shoot out with the Dogs. So Lyon, playing to his side’s proven defensive strengths made sure the Bulldogs confronted a congested back half whenever possible to deny Barry Hall and company leading space.
The Bulldogs were determined not to be beaten on the rebound and employed exactly the same tactics when the Saints had the ball.
This led to both teams employing a lot of sideways and backwards midfield kicking to retain possession, very little quick movement into the attacking zones or attacking through the centre square and the result was a paltry 30 scoring shots in perfect conditions.
It is not the primary function of coaches to provide a good spectacle, finding a way to win comes first, second and third as priorities.
However if we could find a way to prevent what happened last Friday it would be most beneficial because it was a big turn off for spectators and TV viewers alike. Becoming the lowest scoring game ever played at Etihad with a disposal per goal of 66 to one is nothing to be proud of.
It was St Kilda’s lowest winning score under Lyon but they didn’t play all that differently in an offensive sense. It's just that they didn’t have Riewoldt tearing from flank to flank across half-forward to give their back half something to kick to on the way out.
It was also the Dogs’ lowest score under Rodney Eade since the 2006 finals, and the second lowest in his time at Whitten Oval.
How do teams handle the situation where play is held up and 18 opposition players are in one third of the ground blocking the path to goal?
The temptation is to kick the ball backwards and sideways in the hope of finding a way in, but defensive zones are so good these days they move with the kick. Unless one player is asleep it’s a difficult assignment, and the St Kilda zone is always alert.
So what do you do?
First you need powerful long targets. It makes me realise just how good Alastair Lynch was in a two-on-one situation deep inside the forward 50 during the Brisbane Lions' premiership era.
Lynchy would often be confronted with his direct opponent plus another defender jumping third up, and yet he would force himself to the contest and at least bring the ball to ground preferably 10-15 metres out from goal.
It was something Dogs full forward Barry Hall found difficult last Friday night when confronted with the same circumstance.
At one stage, with St Kilda ruckman Michael Gardiner standing 15m from goal blocking the key defensive post, Dogs counterpart Ben Hudson was 50m out at half-forward trying to get usable.
My view is that Hudson had to be back with Gardiner because finding a hole in the St Kilda zone is very difficult and no matter whether Hall or Lynch or even Wayne Carey is playing deep, no forward can compete one on two against a 200cm ruckman.
Eventually, no matter how long you share the ball outside the 50m arc, you’ve got to go in to score and sometimes there is no better option than kicking the ball long to height 10-15m from goal, with good numbers at ground level ready to try to win it off the pack.
The simple principle is if an attacking player gets time and space 15m out they are a good chance of kicking a goal and if the opposition gets their hands on it they are still 150m from where they need to go to score with a wall of players to work through.
It is about being either very quick to play on before the opposition defensive structure can get in place or to be patient and allow teammates the chance to set up if already crowded.
Currently players tend to err on the side of patience because they expect to confront an outnumbered attacking area and are trained to avoid kicking to a contest unless all other options have been exhausted.
While all teams have clearly defined defensive strategies, I don't believe anyone is as organised for a set kick into a flooded forward line.
When you are left with no choice but to kick long to a crowded forward 50, the pivotal point is making sure that everyone knows what the team plan is, what you are hoping to achieve and what is your individual role to perform.
Equal marking height in a pre-determined position in front of goal, ground level numbers ready to support this pack contest and rebound defensive coverage in place to lock the ball in if the opposition wins possession, are all necessary plans.
It requires a type of forward zoning to get designated players in the area where the ball is directed. It needs numbers at the contest to outnumber the defensive team, instead of individuals all trying to get used.
While the St Kilda-Bulldogs game was an extreme example, defensive structure and flooding are now standard across all teams when play is held up around midfield but the reality is the attacking teams in these situations don’t appear to be anywhere near as well co-ordinated.
The views in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the clubs or the AFL.
